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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies two attempts that have been made to stimulate trade 
among developing countries by means of a trade-preferential system under 
the auspices of GATT and UNCTAD. It wil! be shown that these attempts 
have not been successful when measured in terms of the number of countries 
that have offered so-called "concessions" and the number of products for 
which substantial tariff cuts have been proposed. 
As shown, the lack of success is due to abrupt changes; in Jhe framework 
in which the negotiations take place and to the insufficiënt economie and 
politica! contributions by the larger developing countries. 

TOWARDS A GLOBAL SYSTEM OF TRADE PREFERENCES AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Economie policies in many developing countries have resulted in complex 
trade and industrialization regimes that have had a profound impact on 
the structure and market orientation of production. A wide range of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers have protected the manufacturing sector from inter-
national competition and have stimulated an inward-oriented pattern of 
industrial development. Production has become inefficiënt in many industries 
and comparative advantages have been exploited only to a limited extent. 
However, it would be a fallacy to charaeterize industrial policies of 
developing countries as a continuous move towards more protection against 
international competition and a further seclusion from world markets. 
Many countries have made attempts to liberalize their economy so as to 
create a structure of production which makes a more efficiënt use of avail-
able factors of production and is more capable to reap advantages of inter-
national specialization. Such attempts have been undertaken by individual 
countries as well as by (regional) groups of countries that have been co-
operating to establish trade preferential areas. The most ambitious attempt 
to co-ordinate liberalization efforts of developing countries has been the 
proposed Global System of Trade Preferences amon Developing Countries 
(henceforth GSTP) that wil! be discussed in this paper. By way of introduc-
tion to a review of an earlier attempt to create a preferential trading 
system among developing countries under the auspices of GATT, and the more 
recent attempt under the auspices of UNCTAD to create a GSTP, we shall made 
some general observations on implementing rule systems in the area of inter-
national trade. 
Gains of trade and liberalization donot depend on reciprocity. Nevertheless, 
co-ordination of liberalization attempts may be advantageous to all countries 
engaged in such attempts provided that a number of conditions are met. 
To be successfully implemented, the rule system must, first of all, be 
acceptable to all partners in the negotiations. Negotiating countries may 
differ widely in economie structure, conduct and performance, and consequently 
have different power positions from which they enter negotiations. The size 
of the domestic market and the competitiveness of domestic suppliers are 
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major sources of power when it comes to negotiations on the liberalization 
of trade regimes. Countries that do possess an import-capacity-based 
bargaining power or a bargaining power based on industrial competitiveness 
may dominate negotiations by compelling concessions via reciprocity. In 
the real negotiations, therefore, concessions are spelled out by the inner 
group of principal suppliers to ensure broad reciprocity. According to 
W. Cline "(s)ome argue that in economie terms MFN (most favoured notion), 
has in practice been conditional because the products submitted for tariff 
liberalization have systematically been selected such that they came 
primarily from countries that offered tariff concessions in return, and 
tariff cuts might have been more limited had this not been the case."1 
Beneath the most-favoured nation approach, there appears to be a kind of 
sector-wise negotiation approach based on reciprocity. At the other extreme 
are countries with a smal! domestic market and a weak and little diversified 
domestic economy. Such countries lack import-capacity-based negotiating 
power and -their industry lacks competitiveness required to gain from improved 
access to foreign markets that results from the negotiation process. There-
fore, equal rules for unequal partners in the negotiations may be an in-
sufficiënt offer to be acceptable for the countries least equipped to 
liberalize. However, once a set of rules is accepted and implemented, this 
set itself may become a liberalizing force: rules that are internationally 
agreed upon may function as a support system to governments for defending 
liberalization measures against domestic interest groups opposing such 
efforts.2 
To contribute to welfare, the accepted rules should have a significant trade 
creating impact on the countries engaged in the negotiations. This depends 
on the depth and width of the negotiated reductions of trade barriers. The 
contribution to welfare ultimately results from the reduction in the domestic 
price distortion brought about by "unjustified" government intervention. 
Since tariff and non-tariff barriers are frequently applied in combination, 
trade creation effects can only be substantial if the total package of 
barriers is reduced at the same time. Negotiations on tariff reductions are 
likely the starting point of any negotiation on trade barrier reductions. 
In case other trade barriers are not adequately dealt with, however, such 
negotiations may ultimately result in a next-best intervention system and 
create welfare losses, due to the shift from tariff to non-tariff measures 
in the trade regimes. To have a significant impact on all participating 
countries negotiations on cuts in trade barriers should cover a wide range 
- 3 -
of product groups since there are large differences in the structure of 
production and trade between developing countries. 
In brief, the implementation of a GSTP is an extremely complicated affair. 
It involves a large number of countries that differ widely in leve! of 
economie development and in economie and politica! system. Additionally, 
in many of these countries both government and domestic producers are highly 
dependent on the existing system of trade barriers for their income which 
makes the liberalization issue all the more sensitive. Also, the system of 
trade barriers itself is partly unknown for a number of countries participating 
in the preparatory negotiations. Moreover, the economie impact of many trade 
barriers in use is hardly tracable. Consequently, the effeets of changes in 
barriers - the so-called "concessions" to trading partners - are hard to 
quantify. 
Notwithstanding these obstacles and some discouraging experiences with less 
ambitious regional preferential systems, preparatory negotiations for a 
GSTP have been taking place that aim at the implementation of such a system 
in a group as large as possible of developing countries. 
2. THE GATT PROTOCOL RELATING TO TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Notwithstanding the provision of Article I of GATT, a differential and more 
favourable treatment of developing countries through the creation of regfonal 
of aiobal trade preferential arrangements is provided for in the so-called 
Enabling Clause. Th is clause, included in the Protocol of the Tokyo Round, 
thus constitutes the standing legal basis for preferential trading systems 
among developing countries. For many years, developing countries had pressed 
for such a legal right to exceptions from the two bas ie principles of GATT, 
non-discrimination and reciprocity. Until the Tokyo Round Protocol, exceptions 
from the non-discrimination rule could only be adopted by ad hoc waivers. 
Non-reciprocity was already included in Part IV 'Trade and Development' 
of the GATT (1965). 
An initial effort to implement a preferential trading system among developing 
countries was undertaken under the auspices of GATT and supported and co-
serviced by UNCTAD. A Protocol Relating to Trade Negotiations among Developing 
Countries was implemented and signed by 16 countries at November 26th, 1971 and 
entered into force at February llth, 1973. 3 Since the GSTP is an offspring 
of this Protocol, be it procreated under somewhat peculiar conditions, we 
shall first review this previous attempt to create a preferential trading 
system among developing countries. 
Basic stimulis to engage in such a preferential system was the disenchantment 
of developing countries with the results of the Kennedy Round (1964-1967). 
The foundation of the negotiation process was laid in Maren 1965 with the 
establishment of the GATT Committee on Trade and Development. This committee 
established a Group on Expansion of Trade among Developing Countries that 
made an investigation of problems related to the stimulation of trade among 
developing countries. By the end of 1967 the Trade Negotiations Committee 
of Developing Countries in GATT held its first meeting. During the fact-
finding stage, the negotiating countries had submitted lists of products 
that were exported or expected to be exported by them in the near future. 
At one stage or another, 37 countries took part in the negotiations that 
went on for al most four years before they were finalized in February 1973. 
By the end of 1968 it was agreed that the actual negotiations were to start, 
based on specific lists of requests for concessions by partners. By the end 
of 1969 only 13 countries had submitted such lists with requests. By the 
end of 1970, 18 countries were actively participating in the negotiations. 
While 19 countries requested concessions, only 12 countries offered conces-
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sions. During the period March-August 1971 the essential negotiations too'k 
place. Finally, on October 15th, 1971, 48 bilateral agreements were reached 
among 16 countries and a draft text was adopted. On November 26th, 1971 
a Protocol Relating to Trade Negotiations among Developing Countries was 
implemented and signed, and entered into force on February llth, 1973. 
As declared in the Protocol fts aim is to foster a rational and outward-
looking expansion of production that benefits from the advantages of 
specialization and economies of scale. This should be brought about by the 
reduction or elimination of both tariff and non-tariff barriers to be 
negotiated among the participating countries according to the principle of 
mutual benefits. It was agreed that a most-favoured-nation approach was to 
be pursued: concessions pursuant to the Protocol are applicable to all 
participating countries (par-. 1). The effects of-concessions should not be 
reduced by the imposition of new trade barriers. However, countries are 
allowed to impose such new barriers (1) when such a~"char'gë corresponds to 
a newly charge on the domestically produced product, (2) in the case of 
dumping by the foreign supplier and (3) as a countervailing duty (par. 3). 
Additionally, countries are allowed to implement new trade barriers in case 
of balance-of-payments problems or the threat"thereof (par-. 11) or in case 
of injury or the threat thereof (par. 12). In case such a safeguard measure 
is taken in case of emergency and a concession is suspended, the affected 
exporting country is allowed to suspend equivalent concessions, for instance 
by means of the imposition of countervailing duties. For three reasons the 
Protocol could have only a limited impact on trade and welfare in the 
participating countries. First, the number of signatories was limited. The 
Protocol entered into force in February 1973 for Brazil, India, Israël, 
Pakistan, Korea Republic, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Subsequently it 
entered into force for Tunisia (March 1973), Egypt (August 1973), Chile 
(May 1974), Mexico (August 1974), GreeCe (November 1974), Uruguay (September 
1975) and Peru (May 1976). Accession to the Protocol was made by Paraguay 
(November 1975ï, Bangladesh (August 1976) and Romania (September 1978). 
At a later stage, Bangladesh and Romania signed the Protocol while Paraguay 
signed ad referendum. The Philippines signed but had not yet ratified the 
Protocol and Argentina had requested for accessation to the Protocol by 
1984. At June, 28th, 1980, Greece withdrew from the Protocol because of its 
accessation to the EC. 
Second, the number of concessions was limited. The 48 bilateral agreements 
among 16 participating countries included 740 tariff positions. These con-
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cessions were ultimately "multilateralized" in the final stage of the 
negotiations and extended to all participating countries. About one third 
of these concessions relate to agricultural products and raw materials, 
products that play a relatively important rol e in total preferential trade 
among the participating countries.1* Concessions were mainly granted for 
products not produced domestically in the country offering the concession. 
Nine countries originally offered 15 tariff concessions or less, only four 
countries offered 50 to 100 tariff concessions. It is.true that in the end 
all concessions applied to all signatories but many of these concessions 
related to very specific products that were produced and exported by only a 
few countries. All together, imports of concessional items from participating 
countries as a percentage share of total imports of these items in the 
participating countries was 9.3 in 1976, 8.9 in 1977 and 9.2 in 1978. 
Third, the package of issues to be negotiated was rather limited. With 
respect to trade concessions, only tariffs were negotiated. Non-tariff 
barriers were not on the agenda. No additional policies were discussed to 
integrate the economies of the participating countries. Thus, this integra-
tion attempt is a typical example of negative integration, i.e. integration 
through the reduction of trade barriers. In brief, a fairly smal! number 
of countries were involved in the negotiations on a rather limited number 
of tariff reductions on products that were selected in a time-consuming 
negotiation process. The selection of products was in many cases apparently 
based on the criterion that trade liberalization were not to increase import 
competition in a significant way. 
After five years of experience the Committee of Participating Countries 
undertook a review.5 It was concluded that "the operation of the Protocol 
has been encouraging and provides a basis for the expectation that the work 
presently being undertaken with a view to the further enlargement in terms 
of membership and coverage will make a substantial contribution to a 
further significant broadening of the area of trade co-operation among 
developing countries".6 It certainly did not follow from this review that 
the effort should be terminated. On the contrary, prolongation with a new 
round of negotiations was on the agenda of the committee from 1973 onwards. 
On its meeting of July 1979 it was suggested to convene a meeting within 
short to define the objective of new negotiations. Thus, the meeting that 
was convened on October 1979 and attended by representatives of 56 countries 
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was thought to be a preparatory step for new rounds of negotiations within 
GATT. However, at that very meeting some representatives emphasized 
that negotiations on trade "liberalization were part of a broader programme 
of economie co-operation among deveioping countries that they considered 
their primary responsibility to negotiate and implement. Moreover, instead 
of describing the meeting as "Trade Negotiations among Deveioping Countries" 
its character was changed into ad hoc consultations among member countries 
of the Group of 77 and others.7 This intervention was inspired by the 
limited outcome of the negotiations within GATT so far but as well - and 
may be even above all - by political motives. Rather than prolonging and 
extending the existing preferential arrangement, a new system of preferences 
was to be created. 
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3. CHANGING THE FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS 
An important step towards the preparation of a new round of negotiations 
on a preferential trade system among developing countries was taken at the 
Third Mini sten'al Meeting of the Group of 77 in Mam'la in January and 
February 1976. At this preparatory meeting for UNCTAD IV it was decided 
to propose the establishment of a Committee on Economie Co-operation 
among Developing Countries. The proposal was accepted by UNCTAD's board 
on October 1976 and the newly established committee decided in early 1977 
to use the Mexico City Programme of Action, formulated in May 1976, as its 
guideline for future activities. One of the programme points for action 
was the creation of a global system of trade preferences among developing 
countries, and the committee agreed that this point should have priority 
status in UNCTAD. Priority status was also attached to the promotion of 
co-operation among state trading organizations and the establishment of 
multinational marketing enterprises in developing countries. The proposal 
to establish a preferential system among developing countries was presented 
at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi, 1976. Apart from the overall economie goal of 
stimulating economie development in the participating countries, the 
proposal emphasizes the possible contribution of such a system to the 
strengthening of collective self-reliance of developing countries. It was 
stressed that the modalities of the system should be so that it would ensure 
trade advantages for the least developed countries. 
To facilitate the negotiation process the UNCTAD secretariat undertook a 
series of studies on issues to be negotiated such as rules of origin and 
special measures in favour of least developed countries.8 At UNCTAD V in 
Manila, 1979, the Group of 77 called for the establishment of an UNCTAD 
Trade Information System as a support mechanism for the negotiations. This 
was forma!ly approved in May 1982 but the system started to operate already 
in September 1981. To further stimulate the preparations, the Committee 
on Economie Co-operation among Developing Countries was requested (by a 
meeting of governmental experts in April 1981) to establish a GSTP committee. 
This committee was set the task to prepare and undertake the negotiation 
process. This committee, to be serviced by UNCTAD, was formally established 
in a declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Group of 77 at 
New York, October 1982. 
We shall now turn to a discussion of the proposals related to the main 
issues to be included in a GSTP. 
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4 . PROPOSALS FOR A GSTP 
4.1 Introductory remarks 
As of now the process of negotiating trade preferences among developing 
countries within the framework of a GSTP is stil! in its preparatory stage 
- and it is not clear when the detailed negotiations o'n trade concessions 
are going to take place, if at all. Therefore, the proposals discussed 
here donot reflect outcomes of negotiations among participating developing 
countries but are merely suggestions and ideas that have been formulated 
in background papers and expert reports during the many years preparations 
are alreay taking place. Si nee October 1982, when the Committee on Economie 
Co-operation among Developing Countries was formally established, progress 
in some preparatory areas have been made, the most significant of which is 
the development of an information system on tariff and non-tariff barriers 
by UNCTAD. " -
4.2 The reduction of barriers to trade 
The GSTP intends to reduce tariff and'non-tariff barriers and aims at an 
even distribution of the overall benefits of such reductions among participating 
countries. It does not intend to supplement existing (regional) preferential 
systems but to complement these. Nevertheless it wil! affect existing systems 
in that it reduces the preferential margins enjoyed by countries participating 
in these systems vis-è-vis other developing countries. It has been proposed 
that all tariff and para-tariff concessions are given on a most-favoured-
nation basis to all countries participating in the negotiations. An exception 
is made for all least developed countries that are entitled to enjoy 
(exclusive) preferences on a non-reciprocal basis.9 The most-favoured-nation 
approach, however, does not imply that existing (regional) preferential 
systems among countries participating in the GSTP cannot be extended once 
the GSTP comes into force: neither existing nor future preferences among 
regional groupings need be extended on a most-favoured-nation basis.10 It 
has been proposed that existing tariff and para-tariff preferences given by 
a participating developing country or other developing countries outside 
the framework of an existing grouping shall be tabled as negotiating offers. 
The concessions that follow from these negotiations wil! subsequently be 
extended on a most-favoured-nation basis. Preferences given by a participating 
developing country to a developed country shall be extended to all participating 
countries. There are several approaches to tariff reduction. The product-by-
product approach is complicated and time consuming as follows from the 
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experience with the negotiations on the GATT protocol on trade preferences, 
discussed earlier. For that very reason, such an approach was not followed 
during some major previous rounds of tariff negotiations such as the 
Kennedy Round and the Tokyo Round. There is a high risk indeed that a 
product-wise approach will concentrate on tariff reductions in a number 
of product groups that are especially of interest to the most important 
countries involved, bypassing the interest of smaller countries that have 
less concessions to offer. Moreover, such an approach may tend to result 
in the lowest common denominator of achievement. A sectoral approach may 
also be envisaged in which, per sector, all tariff and non-tariff barriers 
are dealt with simultaneously in a comprehensive way. Here again is the 
risk that only a relatively limited number of countries may have great 
interest in the sectors selected for negotiations. As is born out by 
experience, an across-the-board approach to tariff cutting that includes 
the maximum number of trade items feasibTe, is by far the most preferable. 
Negotiations on trade items, not included, could be on an item-by-item 
approach, but here again, genera! and automatic application of rul es might 
be preferable. Although a flexible approach in negotiating preferences is 
called for that enables (groups of) countries to choose from the three 
approaches mentioned here, there is a clear preference for an across-the-
board approach, supplemented by both other approaches. This may especially 
be required to secure sufficiënt concessions for the least developed coun-
tries.11 
Several tariff-cutting formula may be applied, ranging from linear tariff 
cutting to a tariff harmonization formula. A linear across-the-board tariff 
cut has the major advantage of being relatively simple, but it may well 
result in an unequal distribution of benefits among participating countries.. 
A major determinant of the effect of a tariff cut on the si ze of trade flows 
is the price effect of the tariff cut, which is dependent both on depth 
of the tariff cut and the initial tariff level. With T the initial tariff 
rate and t the rate to cut tariffs the price effect p of t is 
p = t.T^d+T^. 
Consequently, the application of a uniform tariff cut across countries may 
result in quite different price effects. This holds even if the negotiating 
partners have identical initial average levels of tariffs, because of the 
differences among countries in the dispersion of tariffs. Therefore, a 
simple linear tariff cut may lead to unequal "concessions". Given the depth 
of the uniform tariff cut it goes that the higher the initial tariff level, 
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the larger the price effect. However, in the case of excessive initial tariff 
levels this may not have a real economie meaning since even after the tariff 
cut tariff rates may be prohibitive. In such cases a tariff harmonization 
formula or écrêtement (cutting the peaks) might be applied in which the 
tariff cut is deeper the higher the initial tariff level. In such an approach 
tariff cuts and price effects differ, ultimately resulting in more equalized 
levels of tariffs among countries in the post-negotiations era. In case the 
original tariff level was not excessive it follows that the most sensitive 
sectors that are protected most will face the largest price effects in the case 
of a uniform tariff cut and even more so if a tariff harmonization formula 
were applied. If sensitive sectors with relatively high initial tariff rates 
were allowed reduced tariff reductions to avoid these large price effects 
(or to realize equality in price effects in all negotiating countries) this 
approach would result in non-uniform- ta-riff•-eut-s-, harmonized price effects 
and increased tariff dispersions in the post-negotiations era. If, in 
case of large initial tariff dispersions~'among~ countries, the approach would 
be that countries with relatively low tariffs were allowed reduced tariff 
reductions as compared to countries with initial high tariff levels, so as 
to harmonize tariff levels, this would substantially reduce the overall 
trade liberalization effect of tariff reductions-. Such-an approach would 
be particularly harmful to "third countries" that are offered reduced tariff 
reductions and would not so much be harmful to countries that do have 
relatively high tariffs themselves as they are most likely no major exporters. 
The hard core of the tariff negotiations proposals as formulated by a group 
of experts consists of an across-the-board linear tariff cut to which are 
added a number of provisions. The across-the-board linear tariff cut should 
be applied to agricultural products and other unprocessed commodities, 
semi-manufactures and industrial products so as to provide a substantial 
trade interest to the largest possible group of developing countries, in-
cluding the least developed countries.12 Exports of many developing countries 
are concentrated in quite a limited range of products and are dominated by 
unprocessed products. 
It has been suggested that the initial margin of preference should be limited 
to avoid disruptions. Therefore a linear tariff cut of 10 to 20 per cent 
has been suggested. This initial cut is envisaged to be proceeded by a new 
round of tariff cuts of a similar depth.1 3 To limit somewhat the number of 
exceptions to the genera! rule, it has been suggested to allow exception 
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"h'sts for sensitive products with 100 to 200 CCCN positions per country. 
It is envisaged that this across-the-board rule might be adapted to ensure 
that minimum levels of effective concessions are effectuated by the formula-
tion of maximum tariff rates and of minimum percentage tariff cuts.IIf 
Elsewhere, a minimal margin of mutual preference of some percentage points 
among partners has been suggested.15 Hamza nas suggested to apply the 
so-called Swiss formula that has been applied in' the Tokyo Round. According 
to this tariff harmonization formula tariffs are cut according to 
T2 = t.T1/(t+T1). 
If an across-the-board tariff cutting formula were applied, countries wil! 
claim the right to exclude products from tariff reduction. As i t seems likely 
that products on the exclusion l i s t wil! be highly protected by tar iffs , 
i t may wel! turn out that the economie meaning of the tariff cuts wil! be 
16 
very limited. No proposals have been formulated on how to deal with the 
products on the exemption lists and it is not clear to what extent a 
sector-wise negotiation approach towards the products listed is envisaged, 
as has been done in other multilateral negotiations such as the Kennedy 
Round.17 
Apart from the right to exclude products from tariff reductions, flexible 
safeguard measures, to be discussed later, have been suggested to reduce 
the risk of disruption. Tariff quotas and seasonal tariff reductions for 
agricultural products have been envisaged as well for the same purpose. The 
genera! rule of a uniform taruff cut is supplemented by specific rules for 
least developed countries.18 Because of the lack of international competi-
tiveness of industry in these countries, it has been proposed that these 
countries implement a more limited tariff cut of 5 per cent (proposal of 1981) 
or 10 per cent (proposal of 1980).19 At the same time, these countries must 
be offered preferential treatment in importing developing countries (ex-
cluding the least developed) through a deeper than general tariff cut in 
their favour of 30 per cent instead of 20 per cent. The use of more flexible 
criteria for rules of origin in favour of developing countries have been 
proposed as well to strengthen the position of these countries in inter-
national trade.20 This will be discussed in more detail below. 
In many developing countries, non-tariff barriers are a much larqer obstacle to 
trade than tariff barriers are. Due to the complex and opaque structure of 
non-tariff barriers, it seems likely that negotiations on the reduction of 
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such barriers wil! be more difficult and time consuming than the negotiations 
on tariff cuts. To avoid invalidation of negotiated tan'ff reductions, there-
fore, a standstill in the area of non-tariff barriers is required as long as 
negotiations on these barriers are going on.21 However, an exception is 
envisaged here for least developed countries that should be permitted to 
adopt quantitative restrictions to protect their domestic industries from 
the effects of trade liberalization.22 More in genera! it goes that such 
a standstill may be abrogated in the case countries take safeguard measures 
to protect domestic industry or the balance of payments.23 
4.3 Rul es of origin 
Trade preferences, by definition, deal with products originating from coun-
tries that do have preferential access. Rul es of origin are required to 
define which of the products imported from countries with preferential 
access do originate from these countries and are, consequently, entitled 
to preferential treatment. Goods that are imported by a member country of 
the trade preferential area from a non-member country must have undergone 
a substantial transformation in the member country to be entitled to preferential 
treatment when traded among member countries. Two kinds-of rules of origin 
are usually applied,referred to as the percentage criterion and the process 
criterion. When the percentage criterion is applied the product is entitled 
to enjoy preferential treatment when at least a specified share of its value 
is added in the country participating in the preferential system. When the 
process criterion is applied it is required that the imported inputs have 
undergone a specified transformation process or have been transformed to 
such an extent that the processed inputs are classified differently from 
the unprocessed inputs according to the CCCN nomenclature. This shift in 
classififation is referred to as a "BTN-jump". 
Both criteria have their advantages and drawbacks.27 The major advantage 
of the percentage criterion is its uniformity; its major drawbacks are related 
to the '•'arbitrar-iness" of prices of inputs and outputs. Prices, in the real 
world, are subject to many factors that make them deviate from theoretical 
"equilibrium prices". Moreover, they are far from stable, especially in the 
case of primary products. The major advantages of the process criterion are 
that it gives a precise formulation of the minimal transformation required 
to entitle the product to enjoy preferential treatment and that it is 
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independent of prices. The major drawback of the criterion is that a 
"BTN-jump" does not necessarily coincide with a substantial addition of 
value to the imported inputs. For a product to get preferential access 
within the preferential area, it is not necessary that the transformation 
of imports* from a non-member country has taken place in the one member 
countuy that exports the product to another member country. A cumulation 
provision may be applied that takes into account the value added creation 
or the process of transformation in all countries participating in the 
preferential system. 
Preferential systems differ in their application of rules of origin as 
illustrated in tab!e 1. Some systems apply the percentage criterion while 
others use the process criterion, i.e. the "BTN-jump". Some systems have 
a specific provision for-assemtxly and most systems have a "full cumulation" 
provision. In some cases more relaxed rules of origin are applied in favour 
of least developed countries.-Column 2 shows that with respect to the 
"percentage criterion" generally at least 40-50 per cent of the value of 
the product must be produced in member countries of the preferential area 
to entitle the product to preferential treatment. This may have quite a 
restrictive impact- on preferent-ia-T trade opportunities among member coun-
tries and may be to the advantage of the larger and/or more developed coun-
tries that have a more diversified industrial sector, allowing them to 
process to a sufficiënt extent imported inputs. In general, exported 
manufactures of developing countries have a high import content and con-
sequently a low domestic value added component. 
The UNCTAD consultative group of experts has proposed to apply across-the-
board the"BTN-jump"as the criterion for rules of origin.28 However, as 
mentioned earlier, this criterion has the shortcoming that a "BTN-jump" does 
not necessarily imply a "substantial transformation" and that a substantial 
transformation is not always reflected in a "BTN-jump". Therefore, a list 
of exceptions should be constructed with products for which a percentage 
criterion applies. More specifically the following proposals have been made. 
For agricultural products (CCCN chapters 1-24) that donot undergo industrial 
transformation the wholly produced criterion should be applied. For products 
in CCCN chapters 25-83 it goes that the "BTN-jump" is the basic criterion. 
For products on the exception list the c.i.f. value of inputs imported from 
outside the preferential area should be less than 50 to 60 per cent of the 
f.o.b. export value. Full cumulation has been suggested here. The area 
Table 1. Rules of origin in regional preferential systems. 
Country 
group 
BTN-jump Extraregional 
ei f import value in 
fob export value 
or 
regional value added 
requirements  
Full cutnulation Assemb 
for im 
export 
LAFTA <_ extr 
impo 
ANDEAN group ^ extr 
impo 
CACM no stringent 
requirements (de facto) 
CARICOM 
(old rules) 
autumn 1978 
(new rules) 
<_ 50 % extraregional 
import value 
x 
x? 
CEAO £ 40 % of materials used 
(quantity), or 
>_ 40 % regional value 
added 
ECOWAS £ 50 % extraregional 
value in total 
materials used. 
<_ 40 7o extraregional 
quantity of 
materials, or 
_> 35 % regional value 
added 
or 
Table 1. (continued) 
Country 
group 
BTN-jump Extraregional 
ei f import value in 
fob export value 
or 
regional value added 
requirements 
Full cumulation Assembl 
for imp 
export 
ASEAN <_ 50 % extraregional 
import value 
ACM £ 60 % extraregional 
import value 
Tripartite Agreement 
Egypt, India, 
Yugoslavia 
>_ 50 % materials 
produced and 
labour performed 
in region 
no cumulative 
treatment 
Source: UNCTAD, Rules of Origin within a GSTP, with Special Reference to Provisions Assuring 
that Preferential Measures Benefit National Development, TD/B/C.7/33 (Part II), Geneva, 1979. 
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comprises not only developing countries participating in the negotiations 
but all least developed countries as well. For least developed countries 
this criterion could be relaxed to 60-70 per cent. 
For products in CCCN chapters 84-99 the percentage criterion has been 
suggested. 
4.4 Safeguard measures 
Some proposals have been drafted concerning the application of safeguard 
measures. Rules of safeguards deal with undoing the results of trade 
liberalization rules that are agreed upon, in order to preserve such rules. 
If the safeguard rules are formulated too loosely they may create the risk 
of the GSTP to be eroded from within. If the rules are formulated too 
strictly they may create the risk of the whole rule system to be undermined • 
by government actions outside the rule system to protect domestic interests. 
In both cases, the predictability of the rule system is undermined and 
protectionist measures may make headway. 
Two major reasons for safeguard actions are distinguishable: balance-of-
payments difficulties and (the threat of) serious injury to domestic producers 
which arises from a sudden increase of imports under the preferential system. 
Thus, the safeguard measures may be applied in the case of broadly defined 
problems and are not restricted to cases of proven unfair competition by 
specific exporters. The country that intends to apply safeguard measures 
is required to give prior notice to affected countries and a Permanent 
Mechanism and to consult with them the nature of the safeguard measures and 
the compensation for its effects to exporters. Agreement is, however, not a 
necessary precondition for implementation of measures. In case of disagree-
ment the affected parties may retaliate by withdrawing compensatory 
concessions.29 The application of safeguard measures has been restricted 
in a report of the Group of 77 to the extent that such measures may not 
affect negotiated concessions during the first year or first two years after 
these concessions have been put into effect.30 
It was agreed upon by the negotiating committee in its meeting on October 
17th, 1984, that safeguard measures should be applied in a non-discriminatory 
fashion among the participants in the GSTP. In earlier proposals, however, 
it was suggested that imports from the least developed countries should be 
exempted from genera! balance-of-payments safeguard measures.31 In principle, 
non-selective application of safeguard measures is preferable over discrimina-
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tion in application. A selective application would most likely affect above 
all new exporters,especially those in small countries that do not have much 
power to retaliate, while the interests of vested exporters in major trading 
partners wil! be respected. If products in a narrowly defined product 
category exported by different suppliers can be considered as substitutes 
there is no ground for a selective approach in the application of-safeguard 
measures. This, indeed, is reflected in GATT Article XIV "Emergëncy Action 
on Imports of Particular Products" that deals with the escape clause. The 
GATT rule is based on the principle of non-discrimination. Nevertheless, 
the experience up to now is that countries prefer not to apply this rule 
but make bilateral arrangements outside the GATT system in case of (the 
threat of) injury. Such arrangements comprise voluntary export restraints 
(VERs), orderly market arrangements (OMAs) and other forms of quantitative 
restrictions. 
Another problenr related -tottie safeguard rule is that there is a lack of 
conditionality on the application of the rule. Without consent of the 
partner(s) a country is allowed to restrict imports and undo preferences. 
There is a need for specified rules related to the period of application 
and the efforts to be ündertaken during this period to adjust to increased 
imports. In case the partner country has great retaliatory power because 
of its importance in bilateral trade flows, the threat of countermeasures 
may prevent a country to apply safeguard measures unduly and without consent. 
However, when the partner country does not have great retaliatory power, 
it may not be able to prevent the application of safeguard measures. There-
fore, to prevent abuse of safeguard measures, strict rules for the applica-
tion of such measures are needed. Moreover, surveillance on a strict applica-
tion of non-discrimination is needed since the threat of multilateral 
retaliation is more preventive than a bilateral threat. The application of 
the rule should be surveyed by an independent body, a so-called Permanent 
Mechanism. 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As outlined earlier, the proposals and ideas related to a GSTP, presented 
here, do not result from negotiations among trading partners but are 
proposals without engagement. Nevertheless, some sobering remarks are in 
place regarding the impact a GSTP is 1ikeiy to have on the trade performance 
of developing countn'es. First, in view of the relatively high tan ff and 
non-tariff barriers in developing countn'es, the proposed cuts in tariff 
barriers will have a very limited effect on resource allocation and trade, 
even if such cuts were applied across-the-board. Erzan, Laird and Yeats 
calculated the effects of different tariff cuts on the value of South-South 
trade?2Their calculations are based on trade values for all developing 
countries, tariff cuts are assumed to be applied across-the-board and 
non-tariff barriers are assumed away. In reality, of course, it wi-11 be 
unlikely that all developing countn'es participate in a GSTP. Besides, it,_ 
is very likely that least developed countries will negotiate for a free 
riders position. Next, it is questionable that tariff cuts will be across-
the-board, and even if they were, products will be excluded from preferential 
treatment and be put on an exception list. Also, tariff barriers are in many 
cases only one element of a complicated set of barriers to imports. The -
calculations show that limited cuts in tariffs yield fairly smal! results 
in terms of projected changes in trade flows. As shown in tab!e 2, South-
South trade would grow by 3.4 per cent in case of a 20 per cent tariff cut. 
For the reasons mentioned above it is likely that the direct impact will be 
more limited in reality. 
Second, in view of the debt-servicing problems many developing countries face, 
poli ei es have been implemented to contract domestic demand and import demand 
and stimulate exports. In a situation of large government deficits and 
trade imbalances it appears rationa! to substitute tariff barriers for 
quantitative restrictions so as to increase government revenue and control 
imports. Under such circumstances liberalization of the trade regime 
appears to be a risky strategy for many developing countries, particularly 
those with a weak export sector. 
f Third, the start of a new round of trade barrier reductions in GATT, the 
j 
i so-called Uruguay round, may wel! invalidate efforts to create a preferential 
| trading system among developing countries. What developing countries want 
i from developed countries is a reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
aqainst labour-intensive products. What'developed countn'es want from developing 
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Table 2. Projected percentage changes in South-South trade. 
Developing countries ' imports from 
GSTP tariff cut developing developed all trade 
countries countries countries balance 
10 per cent 1.7 -0.2 0.3 0.4 
20 per cent 3.4 -0.3 0.6 0.8 
35 per cent 6.0 -0.6 1.1 1.4 
50 per cent 8.5 -0.8 1.6 2.0 
Full tariff margins 17.0 -1.6 3.1 4.0 
Source: R. Erzan, S. Laird and A. Yeats, On the Potential for Expanding 
South-South trade throügh the Extension of Mutual Preferences among 
Developing Countries, UNCTAD Discussion Papers No. 16, Geneva, p. 6, table 1 
countries is that the latter give up their free-rider position in GATT 
negotiations and become full member. The graduation issue implies that 
particularly the middle-income countries should start liberalizing their 
economy and integrate more fully into the world trading system. The point 
has been pushed already during the Tokyo Round and will, undoubtedly, come 
back on the agenda of the next round. Therefore, developing countries will 
use concessions to liberalize their trade regime as a bargaining tooi to 
obtain concessions from developed countries to reduce their tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to products of particular interest to developing coun-
tries. In the meantime they themselves will be extremely reluctant to do 
any trade concession at all outside GATT. 
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